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Effects of War on Lombard Street
CHAPTER 4 has indicated clearly that war brought unusual activity to
Lombard Street, and that the activity was limited almost entirely to
transactions with one customer—the government. So drastic a depar-
ture from the normal functioning ofBritishfinancialinstitutions
necessarily produced changes that may have far-reaching implications.
BANK OF ENGLAND
The most pronounced changes in the Bank of England's return during
the six years of war were the virtual disappearance of the Issue Depart-
ment's gold holdings, the decline in the Banking Department's reserve
ratio, the 150 percent rise in note circulation, and the accompanying
370 percent increase in the Issue Department's holdings of government
securities (Appendix Table A).
The growth of the Bank's note circulation, and the corresponding
increase in holdings of governments by the Issue Department, was
fairly steady throughout the entire war period. The expansion of about
165 percent in total active currency circulation, which in World War
II consisted almost entirely of Bank of England notes, seems moderate
when compared with the 700 percent rise during World War I, or even
with the 340 percent rise in the Canadian and 280 percent rise in the
United States active currency circulation during World War II.
In so far as the Bank's profits were concerned, developments in the
Issue Department were of no importance. As mentioned in Chapter 1,
gold and government securities were the Issue Department's chief
assets, notes its sole liability, even before the war; and since profits of
the Issue Department reverted to the government, the replacement of
gold by interest-earning government securities added nothing to
dividends.'
In the Banking Department, total assets expanded considerably,
and earnings probably rose more than costs, although no official
information is available on this point. However, throughout the war
period dividends were held at 6 percent, as they had been ever since
1Profitsof the Issue Department for various fiscal years were published in the
House of Commons Debates (July 21, 1943), as follows (in millions of pounds
sterling):1940, £6.1; 1941, £8.9; 1942, £7.6; 1943, £9.1.
501923. When the dividend for 1943 was declared, this rate, which is
the same as the first dividend of the Bank, declared in 1695, provided
a yield on current value of shares about equal to the yield on consols.
Possibly the Bank accumulated undistributed profits not shown in its
return, but, on the whole, its position in respect to earnings (which for
many generations has not been a major consideration in the operation
of the Bank) was not profoundly altered by the war.
The Bank's position as a world institution, however, was affected
significantly by developments in both departments. The substitution of
government securities for the Issue Department's gold holdings, and the
drop in the Banking Department's reserve ratio(or "proportion")
far below the traditional 30 percent, constituted a.profoundchange in
British banking. For at least a century before 1931, the Bank of
England's reserve ratio was the primary index of the credit situation
in the whole money market—not for England alone, but for virtually
the whole financial world. No substitute for this easy guide to probable
developments in the money market has been provided. Henceforth,
monetary policy will be guided less by the state of the Bank's return,
and more by a whole complex of criteria, including such factors as the
volume of unemployment and the balance and terms of trade. The
very ease with which the Bank's gold holdings were removed and the
ratio of reserves to deposits reduced without the slightest flurry in the
money market shows how far the world has moved away from a
monetary system in which major decisions were based on purely
banking considerations.
JOINT STOCK BANKS
As in the United States and Canada, the most obvious effect of war
finance on the balance sheets of commercial banks was the increased
holdings of government securities on the one hand and the growth
of deposits on the other (Chart 3)Theimportance among total
assets of government securities of all kinds—both short-term and long-
term—grew considerably. At mid-1945 they amounted to 61 percent
of total assets compared with 58 percent for the United States and 52
percent for Canada. "Investments"—i.e., medium- and long-term
securities—doubled (Table 8); as a percent of total assets, however,
they declined from 24 percent to 22 percent, and as a percent of total
deposits from 27 percent to 23 percent. More important was the port-
2Sincedetailed balance sheet statements for all joint stock banks combined are
not available, the figures in this section are based on data for London clearing banks.
A comparison of the data in Appendix Table B and those in Table 8 indicate that





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































gTable 8—CO1wBINED BALANCE SHEET OF THE LONDON CLEARING BANKSa
(pound figures in millions)
August193gb August1945c
Amount % Amount %
Assets
Coin, notes, and balances with
Bank of England
Balances with other banksd
Money at call and on short notice
Acceptances and endorsements










































TOTALf 2,518 100.0 5,119 100.0
Liabilities
Current accounts



















TOTALf 2,518 100.0 5,119 100.0
a From Bank of England, Statistical Summary, June 1940, p. 46, and December
1945, p. 96. Data are for 11 banks.
b Averages of weekly balances.
CBalanceson a day, varying from bank to bank, toward the end of the month.
d Balances with, and checks in course of collection on, other banks in Great Britain
and Ireland.
e Data not available.
In some cases totals do not agree with sums of items because of rounding.
folio of Treasury deposit receipts, which grew from nothing to 39 per-
cent of total assets. Finally, "bills" at the close of the war consisted
almost entirely of Treasury bills, and amounted to slightly less than
4 percent of total assets. Advances during the war period dwindled
from .39 percent to 15 percent of total assets; in fact, they declined
even in absolute terms.
The rise in investments and the drop in bank advances reversed the
53• customaryrelationship among bank earning assets.3 Investments, con-
sisting mainly of government securities, had increased substantially
during the years 1929-33, but were fairly stable during the later
thirties; the rapid rise since 1939 can be regarded as essentially a war-
time phenomenon. Advances, however, showed a tendency to fall off
relative to other assets even in the thirties, and the wartime decline may
be merely an acceleration of this prewar trend. The Economist has
stated, "Before the war 44 percent of the banks' resources (taking the
clearing banks as a whole) were employed in advances to industry and
private borrowers, while 46 percent represented direct and indirect
loans to the Government—excluding cash, which is really a further,
interest-free, loan. Now the corresponding proportions are 17 percent
for private borrowers and 70 percent for public."4
Total monetary expansion in Britain was considerably less than in
the United States, about the same as in Canada, but somewhat more
than British monetary expansion in World War I, when the money
supply approximately doubled. When clearing bank deposits are added
to currency in circulation, British money supply increased somewhat
more than 115 percent in the six years of World War II, while the
Canadian money supply rose by approximately the same amount, and
the American supply by more than 165 percent. The bulk of deposit
expansion was in current accounts; by August 1945 total deposits
had risen 117 percent while current accounts had increased 161 per-
cent. Direct loans to customers played a relatively small role in deposit
expansion; for the most part, the increase in deposits (as in Canada and
the United States) represented growth of business accounts (Chart 4).
3The"ideal" asset structure was presented to the Macmillan Committee on
Finance and Industry in 1930 by Frederick Hyde, then managing director of the
Midland Bank. A comparison of the current asset structure with this "ideal" shows
that, while the broad outlines are unchanged, the banks have departed considerably
from the "ideal" structure in so far as the detailed assets are concerned (figures are
ratios to assets)
"Ideal" Asset London Clearing
Structure August 1945
Cash items
Cash, etc. 10.0 12.5
Money at call 6.3 16.3 4.5 17.0
Earning assets
Advances 49.5 14.8
Bills discounted 14.5 3.8
Investments 10.8 22.0
Treasury deposit receipts ... . 74.8 38.9 79.5
Other assets 8.9 3.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
TheEconomist, January 26, 1946, p. 140.
54Chart 4—GROWTH OF PERSONAL AND OTHER ACCOUNTS OF
THE LONDON CLEARING BANKSa
(logarithmic vertical scale)
a Source: British White Papers on War Finance, National Income and Expenditure
(Cmd. 6520, April 1944, and Cmd. 6438, April 1943); Monthly Digest of Statistics,
March 1947, Table 126.
Net personal deposits exclude the accounts of businesses, financial institutions,
public authorities, and also those of individual traders, shopkeepers, farmers, and





1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946Cash reserves kept pace with deposits, so that the reserve ratio was
maintained between 10 and 11 percent.5
Published figures of bank profits are not very satisfactory,6 but it
seems clear that war did not injure bank prosperity. While the composi-
tion of earning assets changed, the ratio of earning to total assets
increased, and total assets doubled. Replacement of advances carrying
4 or 5 percent with government obligations bearing 3 percent on long-
term and 1 to 2 percent on short-term, inevitably lowered the rate of
earnings on total bank assets. According to various financial writers,
National War Bonds bearing 21/2percentcomprised a large share of
bank investments. Nevertheless, total profits apparently increased as a
result of over-all expansion. The Economist estimated that gross earn-
ings of the London clearing banks rose from £67 million for the year
ended June 1939 to £84 million for the year ended June
Apparently no bank became subject to excess profits taxation, and there
was considerable speculation as to why this was the case. Several
reasons were suggested: Profits in the base year were high because of
advantageous security sales. The banks were allowed to write off their
German standstill balances against profits for tax purposes. Low
profits in the early war years reduced the taxable average of later years.
It will be noticed that the rate of deposit expansion dropped after the second
year of war. This deceleration has been attributed to the introduction of tax reserve
certificates in December 1941. Individuals and businesses which had previously
held cash balances to meet tax payments preferred to hold tax certificates once these
were made available.
6TheBanker, February 1943, p. 93, speaking of bank profit figures, asked: "What
are we to make, in the circumstances, of the Banks' published profits? Not a great
deal, evidently. 'Itis not always easy,' says Lord Wardington, 'to decide whether
any item in a particular year is likely to be of a recurring nature, and ther.efore
to be reasonably included in our Profit and Loss, or whether, on the other hand, it
would be wiser to consider it as exceptional and more suitable to be placed to
reserve for contingencies in a less favorable year. All these, and many other factors,
make a scientifically accurate comparison of profits one year with another a matter
of considerable difficulty. To show these differences year after year by a closely
detailed analysis of our Profit and Loss would be impracticable in any statement
short enough to be intelligible. The whole matter seems to resolve itself into a
question of sound banking judgment...
7July22, 1944, p. 117. The basis of the calculation is as follows, with volume
and earnings figures given in millions:
1939 1944
Assets VolumeYieldEarnings VolumeYieldEarnings
Call money £150 £1.9£184 1% £1.8
Bills 249 15/s 4.0 ?02 1 2.0
Treasury deposit receipts 1,246 1'/8 14.0
Investments 600 21.7 1,169 36.5
Advances 988 4 39.5 770 3V8 29.8
Gross Earnings £67.1 £84.1
56Costs rose on several counts. The banks paid full salary less soldiers'
pay to members of their staffs who entered the Armed Forces. Interest
paid on deposits rose a little in absolute terms, but as a percentage
of deposits it declined, since most of the increase in deposits was in
current accounts on which relatively little interest was paid.
Table 9 suggests that bank profits rose substantially but tells us
nothing about profitability of banking as a business enterprise. Mr.
McKenna, late Chairman of the Midland Bank, quoted bank earnings
on "the shareholders' true capital" at about 4 percent; but The
Economist believed that, if this figure was correct, the banks must have-
had substantial reserves in excess of those reported.










Barclays £1.6 £1.7 £1.7 £1.7 +10.8% +10.0%
Lloyds 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 +17.4 — 4.9
Midland 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 + 7.0 +13.7
National
Provincial 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 +28.5 +10.0
Westminster 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 +24.3 — 3.3
TOTAL 7.7 8.0 8.2 7.9 +13.5 + 5.2
a FromThe Bankers February 1947, p. 104.
b "The year 1943 was the first in which comparisons in published profits between
the several banks was possible, as in earlier years some banks computed 'net' profits
after deducting tax on their dividends while one bank showed the dividends gross.
This difference is eliminated, however, if published profits are 'grossed-up' by adding
back income tax at the standard rate (and N.D.C. for war years), thus making
comparisons possible over a longer period." Loc. cit.
MERCHANT BANKS
Because of their unfortunate experiences during and after World War
I (as outlined in Chapter 2), the position of the merchant banks was
none too strong when World War II broke out. During World War II
their normal operations were again restricted by the virtual disappear-
ance of bills of exchange and acceptances, by suspension of new issue
business, and by their omission from the list of authorized dealers in
foreign exchange. Little of the expansion noted for the joint stock
banks was evidenced by merchant banks.8 (See Appendix Table E.)
8 Since few of the merchant banks publish complete statements, it is not possible
to give a picture of the effects of the war on merchant banks as a whole.
57Indeed, S. Japhet suffered a net contraction of total assets between
1939 and 1945; advances were reduced sharply, while investments
showed only a slight increase. Baring Brothers and Hambros also added
to their portfolios of "other securities." The net effect on earnings of
the merchant banks is not easy to ascertain; but it seems possible that
those firms which expanded their total assets were able to increase
their total earnings as well.
DISCOUNT MARKET
The discount houses, while hardly showing the expansion of the joint
stock banks, were not held in check so much as the merchant banks.
Bills discounted and investments, in particular, rose substantially.9 The
growth of this latter item, which consisted largely of increased holdings
of short-term government bonds, constituted what The Economist
termed "a silent revolution in Lombard Street." In the late thirties,
the discount market "did indeed deal substantially and increasingly in
short bonds," but this break with tradition was "tolerated simply as a
means of keeping discount market machinery in working order until
itsbill-dealing functions revived."Because oftheir key roleas
go-between for the Bank of England and the joint stock banks, the
disappearance of the discount houses would have required considerable
reorganization of the British financial system. During the war, bond
dealing became "legitimized, and, if not yet the primary function of
the discount market, ... certainlyas important as its bill-dealing func-
tion."0 It is questionable, however, whether the over-all growth and the
shift to bonds were sufficient to offset entirely the reduction in earnings
resulting from the substitution of Treasury bills for commercial bills.
The figures of the three major houses indicate that it was not.
It may have been considerations such as these that persuaded the
Bank of England to express openly in 1941 its long-felt wish to see the
discount market consolidated into fewer and stronger units. In the first
four years of World War II, seven discount houses disappeared, leaving
a total of eleven concerns. By the spring of 1944, the resources of each
remaining concern(except Seccombe, Marshall, and
were at least £500,000, and the eleven combined had resources of
£14.4 millions.12
The interesting feature of this wartime consolidation, however, is
that it took the form of absorptions and mergers rather than with-
9 See Appendix Table D.
10 "Short Bond Problems," The Economist, November 24, 1945, p. 756.
11 Brokers for the Bank of England in transactions with the market.
12 "Consolidation of the Discount Market," The Banker, May 1944, pp. 79-84.
58drawals from the market. Only two concerns retired altogether, and
during the sixth year of war there was actually a net inflow of capital
to the discount market. The reason lies in the opportunity for profit-
able investment in government obligations that developed during the
war and which was expected to remain when the war was over. "It
can be taken for granted," wrote a correspondent to The Banker in
1944, "that [the actual] method of achieving the desired consolidation
would not have been permitted had the authorities not been convinced
that the market after the war will have an important function to
perform in the gilt-edged sphere."3
CAPITAL MARKET
The effectiveness of the embargo on new capital issues is apparent
from Table 10. The immense capital expansion necessitated by the war
was not financed through the regular channels of the capital market.
Table 10—NEW CAPITAL ISSUES IN THE LONDON MARKETa
(in millions)
Total
1938 1939 1940-44 1945 1946
Home
Public bodies £27.6 £12.1 £3.7 .0 .0




Transport .5 .1 .2 .4
Finance 5.4 1.5 .4 .8 11.3
TOTALb 92.7 43.3 23.1 17.0 111.7
India and Ceylon
Public bodies .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Companies .5 .9 .2 .1 .1
TOTAL .5 .9 .2 .1 .1
Other British Countries .
Public bodies 10.1 12.6 .0 .0 .0
Companies 10.7 4.8 1.7 2.4 16.7
TOTAL 20.8 17.4 1.7 2.4 16.7
Foreign Countries
•
Public bodies .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Companies 4.1 4.6 1.6 1.0 2.3
TOTAL 4.1 4.6 1.6 1.0 2.3
TOTAL OVERSEASb 25.4 23.0 3.4 3.5 19.1
ALL ISSUES 118.1 66.3 26.5 20.5 130.8
a FromMidland Bank special report on new capital issues, released January 1, 1947.
Figures for years ended December 31.
b In some cases sums of items do not agree with totals because of rounding.
13 Ibid., p.84.
59This development is not surprising, for, while the Capital Issues Com-
mittee would probably have authorized public issues by war industries,
such securities would hardly have appealed to the investing public.
War plants are specialized investments subject, on the one hand, to
profit limitations and, on the other, to special risks because of the nature
of the market and the high rate of obsolescence of war equipment. It
is for such reasons that a large part of Britain's war machinery was
built up by the government on its own account.
The war and the financial difficulties of reconstruction, inherent in
war on so vast a scale, finally brought action to meet the problem of
providing small and medium-sized British concerns with investment
capital, and of providing intermediate-term credit for British industry.
This problem is one of long standing in England. During the fifty years
prior to 1945, every person and every parliamentary committee con-
cerned with financial problems of British industry and trade empha-
sized the need for new machinery to meet it. The joint stock banks were
frequently criticized for their policy of restricting themselves to short-
term advances representing only a small proportion of the funds in use
by a specific business, and their "noncommittal" attitude toward their
customers. Some critics lauded the American investment bank and the
continental industrial bank financing of industry as examples that
might be followed. Others, however, pointed to the failure of the
German industrial banks, and emphasized the drastic revision in the
nature of British banking that would be entailed in expansion of its
industrial business to the German scale.It was also argued that,
whereas German industry had always been short of capital, there might
not exist in Britain a sufficient long-run demand for intermediate-term
industrial credit to warrant a transformation of the banking system.14
Certain relatively small organizations had been set up to assist with
industrial financing: Credit for Industry, Ltd., owned by the United
Dominions Trust; the Charterhouse Industrial Development Company,
controlled by the Charterhouse Investment Trust; and the Bankers'
Industrial Development Company, set up during the early 1930's under
the joint auspices of the Bank of England and the joint stock banks to
assist large or basic industries with reconstruction. The combined
resources and operations of these organizations, however, were not
adequate to meet the need for intermediate-term credit, and for
capital of small and medium-sized concerns.
In the spring of 1945, with the European war in its final phase, the
14 Cf. G. Eberstadt, "Industrial Banking Reconsidered," The Banker, April 1944,
pp. 15-19.
60Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in the House of.Commons
that two new financial institutions would be set up to meet this vex-
atious problem. One was the Finance Corporation for Industry, owned
by the Bank of England, the insurance companies, and the trust
companies, which held respectively 30, 40, and 30 percent of the total
capital of £25 million. It had power to borrow up to an additional
£100 million, bringing its total potential resources to £125 million.
The stated purpose of the Corporation was "the provision of temporary
or longer period finance for industrial businesses of the country with
a view to their quick rehabilitation and development in the national
interests, thereby assisting in the maintenance and increase of employ-
ment." It was to take no initiative in the reorganization of industry
and to confine its activities to the provision of finance. It was intended
to supplement, and not to displace, previously extant channels through
which industrial concerns obtained finance. The Board of the Company
was chosen from the business world, but "the appropriate Depart-
ments" of the government were to be "kept informed" of "develop-
ments of major importance."15
The second institution, the Industrial and Commercial Finance
Corporation, had capital of £15 million, one-third subscribed by the
Bank of England, the balance by the London Clearing Banks and the
Scottish banks. It had authority to borrow another £30 million from
its shareholders. Its function was "to provide credit and finance by
means of loans or the subscription of loan or share capital or otherwise
for industrial and commercial businesses or enterprises in Great Britain
particularly in cases where the existing facilities provided by banking
institutions and the Stock Exchanges are not readily or easily available."
This statement of purpose was interpreted to mean that the corporation
would make loans mainly within the range of £5,000 to £200,000—
loans too big for the joint stock banks and too small for the capital
market.
Like the Finance Corporation, the Industrial and Commercial
Finance Corporation was designed to supplement, and not to compete
with, other banking facilities and particularly to meet the capital needs
of small and medium-sized businesses. The directors were appointed
by the share-holding banks, and the first chairman was named by the
Bank of England. In keeping with British tradition, no legal limitations
were placed on the powers of the Corporation in regard to the size
of loans it could make.
15See"Finance for Industry and Commerce," Journal of the Institute of
April 1945, p. 72.
61OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IMPORTANT TO
LOMBARD STREET
Other wartime developments of significance to Lombard Street were,
for the most part, similar to those during World War I: a decrease in
exports, loss of shipping, industrialization of other countries, loss of
continental insurance and short-term credit business, liquidation of
foreign assets, and accumulation of sterling balances.
Exports
Commercial exportsof the United Kingdom shrank from £471
million in 1938 to £258 million in 1944. In terms of physical volume,
exports in 1944 were only 30 percent of their 1938 level. Indeed, the
demands of the armed forces and war industries imposed a greater
relative reduction of employment in the direct export industries than in
any other major group of industries. However necessary or advanta-
geous this re-allocation of manpower may have been in terms of allied
war strategy, it left Britain with a particularly difficult task in attaining
her postwar objectives of maintaining full employment and providing a
high standard of living for her people, while meeting her needs for
foreign exchange. The achievement of these goals depended upon the
export industries.
Shipping
Income from shipping was a large factor in Britain's prewar balance
of payments. The insurance of shipping and the financing of trans-
oceanic trade was an important prewar source of revenue to Lombard
Street. The City therefore has a double interest in the fate of British
shipping: one immediate and one indirect. While the correlation
between nationality of ships and nationality of the firms insuring them
and financing their cargoes is by no means perfect, there is some
relation. Other things being equal, itis reasonable to suppose that
the share of Lombard Street in insuring and financing world trade will
vary directly with Britain's share in world oceanic shipping. In addition,
since shipping contributes heavily toBritishprosperity,especially
through helping to balance foreign payments without restrictive or
deflationary policies,it contributes indirectly to the general activity
of Lombard Street.
During World War II, as in World War I, Britain's relative position
as a world shipper deteriorated (Table 11). Before the war, Britain
had the world's largest merchant fleet, amounting in June 1939 to
more than 18 million gross tons, or more than one-quarter of the
world's merchant fleet. During the European war, Britain's loss was
62Table 11—MERCHANT TONNAGE (1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER).






United States (nonmilitary) 8,672,090 27,959,000
United States (military) 8,254,000














Other countries 4,865,360 4,462,000
WORLD TOTAL 60,606,522 69,335,000
a From Knute E. Carison and Geraldine Lytzen, "Postwar Shipping," Foreign
Commerce Weekly, February 23, 1946, P.4. The 1939 data were taken from
Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Vol. II (1939-40) Table 5. Except for the United
States, for which data were supplied by the U. S. Maritime Commission, the figures
for 1945 were developed by adding construction and other acquisition to 1939
figures and subtracting losses.
b United States owned tonnage under lend-lease has been reported as part of the
tonnage of the countries operating it. Thus Great Britain had 1,997,448 gross tons
under lend-lease; U.S.S.R., 613,950; Norway, 181,923; Greece, 100,771; France,
93,445; Belgium, 50,327; Netherlands, 28,202; Poland, 16,529; and China, 14,386.
Great Britain's figure also includes approximately 620,000 gross tons turned over
to Great Britain by Canada.
considerable. Moreover, after the entry of the United States into the
war, Britain diverted resources from merchant shipbuilding to other
fidds of war production, leaving merchant shipbuilding mainly to the
United States, and to a lesser extent to Canada. During the whole
period of the European war, Britain built less than 9 million tons of
merchant shipping; captures and non-returnable acquisitions amounted
to some 2 million tons. In sum, Britain's merchant fleet in June 1945
was less than 15 million tons, some 80 percent of the prewar fleet.
Moreover, inquality and age the merchant fleetin1945 was
"immeasurably inferior" to the prewar fleet.1°
Meanwhile, world tonnage of merchant shipping had increased
10 "Shipbuilding Problems Now," The Economist, March 6, 1948, p. 386. See
also "British Shipping in the New World," ibid., February 7, 1948.
63about 14 percent, with the increase concentrated mainly in the United
States. Canada also enjoyed a substantial growth, and Spain, Sweden,
and Brazil slight increases. All the rest of the world suffered losses;
but while the Axis countries lost the highest percentages of their fleets,
the net loss of tonnage in absolute terms was much higher for Britain
than for any other country except Japan.
Britain therefore entered the postwar period at a considerable dis-
advantage so far as competing for postwar shipping business was con-
cerned. Not only had her merchant fleet dwindled, both relative to
the rest of the world and absolutely, but her shipyards were operating
below prewar capacity, while the yards of the United States and
Canada were operating well above prewar rates.
Industrialization of Other Countries
Britain's problem of expanding exports has been complicated by the
wartime industrialization of countries that formerly provided markets
for British manufactured goods.
In Canada, World War II accelerated the trend, already discernible
in the interwar period, for that country to become an essentially manu-
facturing, rather than an essentially agricultural, country. During 1919,
agriculture contributed 44 percent of the total net value of Canadian
production, and manufacturing 33 percent. When World War H
began, agricultural production had already shrunk to 22 percent of the
total, while manufacturing had grown to 39 percent. In 1943, well over
half the net value of Canadian production consisted of manufactured
goods, and agriculture, despite a 60 percent increase in the value of
agricultural production, accounted for only 20 percent of the total. The
Canadian export situation has been well described by Homer S. Fox,
Commercial Attaché of the United States Embassy in Ottawa. "Prior
to World War I .. exportsof raw materials were nearly double the
total exports of fully and semi-manufactured goods. ...By1944,
exports of manufactures were nearly three times those of raw materials,
although the latter were in turn more than three times the correspond-
ing exports in
In Australia, wheat acreage was reduced during the war, acreage
of some coarse grains expanded, and manufacturing output greatly
increased. Factory employment rose from 542,000 in 1938-39 to
724,000 in 1944-45. Output of industrial metals, machinery, imple-
ments, and conveyances nearly doubled.
The war also led to acceleration of industrial development in such
17H.S. Fox, "Canada's Economy in 1945,"ForeignCommerce Weekly, January
19, 1946, p. 6.
64relatively unindustrialized countries as China and India. There is
good reason to suppose that some of these wartime gains will be main-
tained. India has certain raw materials, such as cotton and leather,
in abundance. Its labor is as yet relatively cheap, and with training can
be made just as efficient as the British labor force. Moreover, India's
new industries are not handicapped by established labor and mana-
gerial procedures, and are in many cases equipped with the most up-to-
date machinery.
Some of the fields of Indian industrial expansion compete directly
with former British exports. Mill production of cotton, for example,
rose 90 percent between 192 1-25 and 1934-38, and another 10 percent
from 1938-39 to 1944-45. The value of production of woolen and
worsted cloth rose during the war from £7.3 million per year to £27
million, and output of woolen clothing increased over 300 percent.
Output of army footwear rose over sixfold. The iron and steel industry
grew substantially, and two new aluminum plants were established.
The engineering industry also expanded; whereas before the war only
10 percent of hand tool requirements were met by domestic production,
by 1944 domestic production met virtually all Indian needs. The
chemical, fertilizer, and drug industries also grew considerably.
There is, of course, no incompatibility between world-wide indus-
trialization and a high level of world trade. A fact frequently cited is
that the bulk of international trade takes place among the advanced
industrial countries. Itis equally clear, however, that all countries
cannot export all types of manufactured goods. World-wide industri-
alization must be accompanied by increased geographical specialization
within the field of manufacturing if world trade is to grow at the same
time. In this process, Britain may find it necessary to abandon some of
her traditional fields of export and to develop new ones.
Effects of the War on British Insurance
Insurance of foreigners was a significant source of income to the British
money market before the war, and payment of insurance premiums
by foreign policyholders was an important source of foreign ex-
change. "The overseas business of British insurance companies and
underwriters at Lloyd's," The Economist has said, "is a national asset
of substantial importance." Aggregate annual premiums were estimated
at £100 million, and the net contribution to the balance of payments
at £12 million to £15 million.18
Much of this business had been derived from countries in Europe
and Asia which fell under the Axis domination during the war. Years
18 "The Export of Insurance," The Economist, August 25, 1945,p. 272.
65of enemy occupation resulted in dispersal of prewar portfolios. In
Japanese-occupied cities such as Shanghai, not only portfolios but
records and staffs disappeared, making it necessary, at the war's end,
for British insurance firms to start from scratch to rebuild their shat-
tered business in the Far East.19 In Europe, the Germans had made not
altogether successful attempts to transfer the British business to German
concerns. A nucleus of perhaps 10 percent of prewar business in France
was available at the war's end as a basis for rebuilding, as a result of
a German regulation which permitted French policyholders to continue
British policies already in force, provided the policies were reinsured in
full with German companies.
Loss of Overseas Investments and
Increase in Overseas Debt
Assistance provided by the United States, Canada, and other United
Nations under the Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid Agreements was "too
little and too late" for Britain to avoid liquidation of overseas invest-
ments on a scale even larger than in World War I. Total sales and
repatriations of British foreign investments up to VE day, most of
which took place before the Agreements were negotiated, are itemized
in Table 12.
Table 12—PROCEEDS OF SALES OR REPATRIATION OF OVERSEAS




Dominions (Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Eire) £201
India, Burma, and Middle East 348
Colonies and other sterling area countries 15




Total, North America 428
South America 95
Europe 14
Rest of world 16
TOTAL 1,118
a Estimates from Statistical Material Presented During the Washington Nego-
tiations, Cmd, 6707 (December 1945) p. 9.
b Does not include collateral for Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan.
19 The Economist, September 22, 1945, pp. 424-25.
66At the same time that the debts of foreigners to Britain were reduced,
the debts of Britain to foreigners were increased. British external lia-
bilities, most of which consist of short-term sterling balances accumu-
lated by foreign banks, increased from £476 million on August 31,
1939 to £3,355 million on June 30, 1945.
The Lend-Lease agreement involved an increase in British net
foreign obligations, not definitely stipulated at the time but later settled
at $650 million. Finally, the financing of wartime imports involved a
substantial depletion of the United Kingdom's gold and dollar reserves.
Between August 31, 1939 and June 30, 1945, those reserves were
reduced from £605 million to £453 million.
The effect of the war on the estimated international capital account
position of the United Kingdom is summarized in Table 13. The figure
for prewar long-term foreign assets, is, of course, only an estimate in
so far as direct investments are concerned.
Table 13—ESTIMATED POSITION OF UNITED KINGDOM ON
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL ACCOUNT, SELECTED DATESa
(in millions)
Foreign Assets 1939 Foreign Indebtedness,
Gold and foreign exchange£700 September 1939 £476
Long-term investmentsb 3,900Plus: Creation of debt,
4,600 Sept. 1939—June 1945 2,879
Less: Sales of Foreign Assets, Equals: Foreign Indebt-
Sept. 1939—June 1945 edness, June 1945 £3,355





aDataon foreign assets are from The Economist, November 10, 1945, p. 688; other
data are from Statistical Material Presented During the Washington Negotiations,
Cmd. 6707 (December 1945) pp. 11, 12.
b Estimated nominal value.
Figures of foreign assets and foreign debts, even if completely
accurate, would provide no clear-cut indication of .the relationship
between interest and dividends received and paid. The net income on
capital account obviously depends not only upon the relative magni-
tudes of assets and debts, but also upon the rate of return paid on
each. By and large, since the foreign assets liquidated have not con-
sisted, to any significant extent, of direct investments upon which the
highest returns are earned (at least in prosperous years), and since
the debts acquired are short-term obligations upon which the rate of
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Uinterest, even after conversion into long-term debt, is not likely to be
high, it would seem that Britain's position at the end of the war had
deteriorated considerably less in terms of net income from foreign
investment than in terms of net long-term capital position.
The figures presented in Table 14 substantiate this view. In 1945,
despite the fact that Britain was probably a slight net debtor on capital
account, she enjoyed a net income of £97 million from foreign invest-
ment. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that this figure
was less than half that received in 1938, and that this decline in net
income from foreign investment involved a serious deterioration in
Britain's balance of payments position as a whole.











Dominions (Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, and Eire) £45 £16 £29
India, Burma, and Middle East 11 22 —11
Colonies and other sterling area
countries 17 12 5
Unallocated, sterling area 22 C 22
TOTAL 95 50
4
Canada 14 3 11
TOTAL 23 16 7
South America 28 1 27
Europe 6 6
Rest of world and unallocated 12 C 12
TOTAL 170 73 97
a Data are partly estimated. From Statistical Material Presented During the Wash-
ington Negotiations, Cmd. 6707 (December 1945) p. 10.
b Gross receipts and payments include certain collections of interest on external
securities remitted to holders overseas. This does not, of course, affect the figures
of net receipts.
CLessthan £1 million.
d Includes income on investments (other than insurance holdings) pledged to RFC.
e Includes interest charges on RFC loan.
f Includes nonrecurring payments of arrears arising in the war years.
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0IMPORTANCE OF BRITAIN'S INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL PosITIoN FOR LOMBARD STREET
Apart from the dependence of Lombard Street for its prosperity on the
general economic and financial health of the nation that it serves,
the British balance of payments problem is important to Lombard
Street because it leads to replacement of private by public lending.
The money market of a debtor nation can still be active; the City
could make money from commissions on foreign borrowing just as
well as on foreign lending. However, concern for the safety of the
pound will limit the volume of private lending to Britain; and Lombard
Street cannot make money out of inter-governmental loans, or from
the operations of the International Monetary Fund and the
Inaddition, some
of the foreign assets liquidated to meet Britain's wartime needs for
dollars were presumably held by financial houses. Others were held
by clients of these houses. It is at least questionable whether domestic
lending to replace these lost assets could be expected to yield returns
equal to those formerly earned on the liquidated assets. Indeed, there
is a strong likelihood that it could not.
On the other hand, in so far as the British international financial
position leads to a successful program of expanding exports, the posi-
tion of Lombard Street will be improved to the extent that the
increased exports are financed by British houses. How successful Britain
will be in expanding foreign trade, and what the share of the City in
its financing will be, are among the major factors that will determine
the future of Lombard Street.
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